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Voting and Power in the Small Firm: 
Alternatives to the One-Share, One-Vote Rule
Robert Goon and John L. Teall
The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance o f most business firms 
provides for proportional voting power which differs substantially from propor­
tional shareholdings o f investors. This problem is particularly acute in small firms 
where several (or many) shareholders may hold significant proportions o f shares. 
This paper reviews well-known game theoretic algorithms (weighting or vote 
assignment schemes) for the alignment of power with proportional sharehold­
ings. It also provides a simple measure of the “misalignment of power from 
proportional shareholdings” and discusses its applicadon in determining more 
equitable vote reassignment schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The one-share, one-vote system of corporate governance is intended to 
provide a fair distribution of power among shareholders with diverse interests 
and expectations. However, it can be shown rather easily that the one-share, 
one-vote system provides a distribution of power that is significantly out of 
proportion to the distribution of votes among shareholders (Dubey & 
Shapley, 1978; Shapiro 8c Shapley, 1978; and Shapley & Shubik, 1954). This 
is particularly true for many smaller companies where each of the individual 
shareholders or partners may hold significant numbers of shares relative to 
the total num ber outstanding. The distribution of power among investors is 
particularly im portant in smaller companies for a num ber of reasons:
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1. Investors in small companies tend to maintain less diversified portfo­
lios. With more significant proportions of their wealth at stake in a 
particular firm, control and risk management is of greater importance 
to these investors.
2. Small firms subject themselves to significant shifts in power due to 
their need to raise capital as they grow. Prospective shareholders in 
the firm will be sensitive to the possibility of being exploited by 
controlling shareholders. This potential for abuse may inhibit the 
small firm ’s ability to raise capital and grow. The reassignment of 
voting rights may be an excellent means to deal with this problem.
3. Given that smaller firms are likely to have several shareholders holding 
significant proportions of the firm’s stock, the power level of each 
shareholder is likely to be of greater consequence.
4. Shareholders of small firms firequently form readily identifiable coa­
litions affecting the power structure of the firm.
5. Small firms differ from larger firms in that their securities tend to be 
less marketable and more closely held, rendering the distribution of 
control and minority discounts difficult to evaluate by owners and 
prospective purchasers.^ Frequently, valuations are m andated and 
determined by court systems and tax authorities. Dant (1975) dis­
cusses the increased willingness of the court system to recognize the 
value of control when establishing minority discounts.
Small firms are particularly suitable for various schemes to deviate from 
one-share, one-vote rules. In addition to the importance of the distribution 
of power to small firms discussed above, it is often easy to determine how 
many shares are owned by an investor at a given point in time when shares 
are transferred and which investors are most likely to vote as blocks.
The game theory literature provides substantial information on the meas­
urem ent of power (e.g, Milnor 8c Shapley, 1978; Owen, 1972; von Neumann 
8c Morgenstern, 1944). These and other works have provided a foundation 
for the measurement and valuation of control in the business and finance 
literature (Rydqvist, 1987; Robinson & White, 1989). The Shapley value and 
its “oceanic” variations (for large firms) have been used most extensively in 
the financial literature (Rydqvist, 1986,1987; Robinson &: White, 1989) and 
there have been occasional references to the Banzhaf index (Rydqvist, 1986). 
Each of these papers note the discrepancy between investor shareholdings 
proportions and relative voting power levels. Ratner (1970) argues that the 
one-share, one-vote rule gives excessive power to holders of large blocks, 
resulting in significant misallocations of resources and redistributions of 
wealth. Meeker and Joy (1980) and Meeker, Joy, and Cogger (1983) in their
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studies of closely held banks demonstrate the importance of voting and 
control in the smaller, closely held firm.
The firm is regarded here as a set of contracts (the corporate charter, 
bylaws, bond indentures, managerial contracts, etc.) characterizing thejoint 
activities of and the payoffs to the contracting parties (see Alchian &: Demsetz 
1972; Fama, 1980; Jensen Sc Meckling, 1976). This contractual structure 
specifies a wide range of the firm’s activities. However, Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1983) argue that it is impractical, cosdy, or impossible for this set of 
contracts to fully prespecify all of the activities which may be necessary in 
reaction to unknown future conditions. Thus, the importance of the voting 
mechanism is that it is intended to provide for “fair” reactions to varying 
conditions on a timely basis. Presumably, the num ber of votes an investor 
holds is a function of the value of his investment in the firm; therefore, his 
voting power is based on the importance of the election to him. Nonetheless, 
the one-share, one vote rule provides for voting power which is not propor­
tional to shareholdings (For example, consider the obvious case of two voters, 
where one has 49 percent of the votes). Voting reassignment schemes such 
as those discussed in the next section have been applied in the political arena 
(e.g.. New York State, certain county supervisorial boards) and maybe applied 
to the corporate arena. The small firm, with its readily identifiable controlling 
factions represents an excellent arena for applications of voting reassignment 
schemes.
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n . MEASUREMENT OF POWER
Consider the following example where a firm with 99 outstanding shares has 
five shareholders (i) whose shareholdings (a;*) are given as follows:
I Wi
A 35
B 30
C 20
D 13
E 1
Total 99
Assume that a simple m ^ority vote will determine the outcome of a simple 
corporate election (a  = 50) with only two possible outcomes (yes/no). What 
are the relative power levels of each participant in this corporate election?
Although the answer to this is a function of exactly how power is measured, 
it will be clear that power is not proportional to shareholdings. An investor 
is said to have power if his vote may be pivotal in a corporate election or if he 
has the potential to “swing” the result of the election. We m ight measure the 
power of a participant in an election by determ ining the likelihood that an 
investor will be pivotal or swing election results. The reader may notice 
immediately that shareholders A, B, and C are capable of influencing election 
results; shareholders D and E are not. Thus, despite their investments in the 
firm, shareholders (or partners) D and E have no voting power in the 
elections of the firm. Clearly, power is not proportional to shareholdings.
One of the earliest and simplest power indices is discussed in Shapley and 
Shubik (1954) and Shapiro and Shapley (1978). The oceanic variation of the 
Shapley Index or Value discussed later has been by far the most influential 
in the financial and economics literature. This index is based on an election 
where n voters queue to vote in any one of n! equiprobable orders or 
permutations. The Shapley Power Index {Si) for a particular voter determines 
the probability that his block of votes will be pivotal assuming that prior votes 
in the queue are cast unanimously, in sequence, and that his position in that 
sequence is random. Thus, this index determines the average marginal 
contribution of voter Y to any voting coalition to which he m ight belong. A 
coalition is defined here to be a subset of voters who cast identical votes. The 
Shapley Index for voter Fis determined as follows:
q=\ ^ Y^Q
where n = the num ber of participants in the election;
q = the num ber of participants in coalition Q  
v( 0  = the characteristic function or maximvrai potential worth of 
coalition f t  1 if the coalition wins and 0 if it loses
V l '
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c(0 =
r i
The maximum worth or characteristic function v(Q) of a coalition Q 
(combination of voters voting identically) might be interpreted as the total 
of its members’ benefits of belonging to the coalition. If v(Q) or v (Q -  {F}) 
are limited to values of either zero or one for the purpose of measming power, 
the normalized Shapley Value 5y/EjSiis regarded as the probability that voter 
Y is pivotal. In this case, a coalition has a maximum worth v{ 0  of one if it 
wins the election or zero if it loses. Using equation (1) (Results and compu­
tations are summarized in Tables 1 and 2), we find that Shapley Values for 
shareholders A, B and C are 1.733 and zero for shareholders D and E.
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Table 1
Pivotal Voters in 120 Potential Election Outcomes
ABCDE BACDE ACBDE ACADE G ^D E GBADE
ABDCE BADGE ACDBE BfiDAE G ^B E GBDAE
ADBCE BDACE ADOBE BDCAE G D ^E GDBAE
DABCE DBACE DACBE DBCAE DGABE DGBAE
ABCED BACED ACBED BCAED GABED GBAED
ABDEC BADEC ACDEB BCDEA GADEB GBDEA
ADBEC BDAEC ADCEB BDCEA GDAEB GDBEA
DABEC DBAEC DACEB DBCEA D G ^ DGBEA
ABECD B ^ C D ACEBD BCEAD GAEBD GBEAD
ABEDC BAEDC ACEDB BCEDA G ^D B GBEDA
ADEBC BDEAC ADECB BDECA GDEAB GDEBA
DAEBC DBEAC DAECB DBECA D G E^ DGEBA
AEBCD BEACD AECBD BEGAD GEABD GEBAD
AEBDC BEADC AECDB BECDA G E ^B GEBDA
AEDBC BEDAC AEDCB BEDCA GEDAB GEDBA
DEABC DEBAC DEACB DERGA DEGAB DEGBA
EABCD EBACD EACBD EBCAD EGABD ECBAD
EABDC EBADC EACDB EBCDA EGADB EGBDA
EADBC EBDAC EADCB EBDCA EGDAB EGDBA
EDABC EDBAC EDACB EDBCA EDGAB EDGBA
Note: The underlined shareholder is the pivotal voter for that particular permutation of voters.
Table 2 
Computing Shapley Values
Sa = l/5 -{ (l/l) -0  + (1 /4 )12  + (l/6)-16 + (l/4)-12 + (1/1)-0}=1.733 
Sb = l/5 -{ (l/l) -0  + (1 /4 )12  + (1 /6 )46  + (1 /4 )12  + (1/1)-0}=1.733 
Sc= l /5 -{ (l/l)-0  + (1 /4 )12  + (1 /6 )16  + (1 /4 )12  + (1/1)-0}=1.733 
& = l/5 -{ (l/l) -0  + (1/4)-0 + (1/6)-0 + (1/4) 0 + (1/1)-0}= 0
^£-1/5-{(1/1)-0 + (1/4)-0+ (l/6 )-0+  (1/4)-0+ (1/1)0}=0___________________________
Notes: There are 5!=120 permutations of five voters from the example. Thus, there are (5-l)!=24  
permutations where a given shareholder votes in a given slot one through five. This table computes 
the number of times a particular voter will be pivotal given his position in the voting queue. For 
example, if Voter A is third to cast his votes, he will be pivotal in 16 out o f 24 potential election 
outcomes. He is pivotal only if  either shareholder B or C (but not both) are ahead of him in slots 
one or two in the queue. Fifty votes out of 99 are required for a favorable msgority.
Normalized values are 1/3  for each shareholder A, B and C; normalized 
Shapley Values are zero for Shareholders D and E. Shareholders A, B and C 
have equal power; shareholders D and E have no power.
Banzhaf (1965) develops a second power index based on the probability 
that the particular voter is a “swinger”. A voter is a “swinger” if he could change 
the election result by changing his vote. The Banzhaf Index has the advantage 
in the corporate setting over the Shapley Indices in that it is based on 
equiprobable voting coalitions or combinations (perhaps generating many 
“swingers”, each of whom are capable of influencing the election result) 
rather than equiprobable voting permutations (orderings of voters where 
only one voter in the “queue” can be pivotal). Thus, it is possible in a given 
election for more than one voter to swing election results.
In a given election, n voters may form 2”^  ^coalitions (including the null 
set), half of which, or 2” are winning coalitions (assuming 0.5w votes are 
required for a mzyority). The num ber of swings for a particular voter \ lj{v), 
equals the num ber of coalitions which require his participation to win. To 
determine a voter’s relative power, one may compute the normalized Banzhaf 
Power Index as follows:
j^N
where |Xi<v) = the num ber of coalitions that require Voter Y  to win 
= the num ber of coalitions that require Voter ^  to win 
N = the set of all voters
The Banzhaf Index permits multiple swingers in any given election 
outcome. If an election outcome generates multiple swingers, increments to 
their power indices are equally distributed. Dubey and Shapley (1978) suggest 
that Banzhaf indices may be revised to reflect probabilities of a given voter 
being a swinger:
By{v) = \yy{v)/2^ \ (3)
where n is the num ber of voters and 2'^  ^is the num ber of potential coalitions 
which may be formed. Table 3 provides an example of applying the Banzhaf 
Index in the small firm.
Each of the indices discussed above has the advantage, particularly in the 
regulatory and judicial arenas, of being “sociologically neutral” in that they 
do not require assumptions regarding the election preferences of any of the 
contestants in the election. Each voting perm utation or combination is 
regarded as being equally likely to be realized. However, this sociological 
neutrality may present some disadvantages in the applied corporate setting.
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Table 3
Swingers in 32 Potential Election Outcomes
Voters for
Voters
against Voters far
Voters
against Voters for
Voters
against Voters for
Voters
against
A BCDE A E BCD AB D C E CDE AB
B A CDE BC A DE AB E CD *ABCD E
C AB DE B D A C E A CD B E *ABC E D
D *ABC E B E A CD A C E B D AB DE C
E *ABCD CD AB E A DE BC A CDE B
M CDE C E M  E BCD A E BCDE A
A CD B DE DE *ABC BC E A D *ABCDE
A D BC E *ABC DE B DE A C *ABCDE
Notes: 1. From the example.
2. Underlined voters are swingers in that potential outcome.
3. Shareholder A is a swinger in 16 of 32 potential outcomes.
4. Shareholders B and C are each swingers in 16 potential outcomes.
5. Shareholders D and E are never swingers.
6. Raw Owen power indices are simply 0 /^ O b=Oc -  2 /3 , and Ojy=OE= 0.
7. The sum of power indices is two.
8. Normalized power indices are simply raw values divided by two.
9. Asterisks denote potential winning coalitions without A ngers.
10. Note that the total number of coalitions = 64 = 26 = 2”^ ^
In many instances the manager, raider or other contestant for control may 
have known specific preferences regarding the outcome of an election. 
Furthermore, one or more of his competitors for control may also have 
indicated preferences or seem likely to form certain coalitions. These stated 
or implied preferences may change the corporation’s balance of power 
significandy. Hence, the corporate charter may provide for the application 
of a power index which reflects contestants’ preferences or likelihoods of 
joining particular coalitions or voting in a certain manner.
Owen (1972) develops a power index which accounts for contestants’ 
preferences by assigning probabilities pi to each voter i  of voting for the 
proposal. Let N h e  the set of all voters in a corporate election and T be a 
subset of voters who might form a coalition. The characteristic function 
(maximum worth which is one for winning coalitions and zero for losing 
coalitions) for coalition T is v{T). The maximum worth or characteristic 
function t;( 7) of a coalition might be interpreted as the total of its members’ 
benefits of belonging to the coalition. Owen’s power index for voter Y is
134 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 3(2) 1994
simply the sum of his contributions to all coalitions, each weighted for its 
probability of being formed:
Oy = ^
TeN\Y
nM- n [ l - p ^ [ v ( T u Y ) - v i T ) ]
ieT UT I
(4)
where N \  Y is the set of all voters, excluding voter Y;
\ { T u Y )  - v { T )  is voter Fs contribution to coalition T;
pi is the probability that voter j^oins coalition T
If the characteristic function results in a value of one for a winning 
coalition and zero for a losing coalition, then Or might be interpreted as the 
probability that voter Fwill be a “swinger” on a winning coalition.
If shareholders are equally likely to form any coalition {pi = 0.5), Owen 
power indices will be the same as Banzhaf indices. The relative strength of 
the Owen index in measuring power in the small firm is that it allows for 
varying uncertainties with regard to formation of coalitions. One may predict 
in many firms that certain coalitions are more likely than others to form (for 
example, among family members). Such prespecified coalitions significantly 
affect the distribution of power in the firm. Thus, one uses the Owen Index 
when participants vary in their probabilities (j&i) in joining a given coalition 
of voters.
In the example given above, Shapley, Banzhaf and Owen Power Indices 
all have the same values. Voter shareholdings {wi), fractional holdings 
power indices {P{, each index is the same for a given voter) and deviations
Table 4
Shareholdings, Power Indices and 
Squared Differences
i Wi fi Pi 2^
A 35 0.354 0.53 0.000576
B 30 0.303 0.33 0.000729
C 20 0.202 0.33 0.016384
D 13 0.131 0 0.017161
E 1 0.010 0 0.000100
Total 99 1.00 1.00 0.034953
= St /5 = 0.0069906.
0  = 0.0836098
Note: Sr=TotalofA
squared ^={fi~Pi)^ are given for each voter in Table 4. We compute the sum 
of squared errors of differences between power index values and actual 
shareholdings: = 0.0069906. The square root of this value, 0.0836, measures 
the “error” or “misalignment of power from proportional shareholdings” in 
using the one-share, one-vote rule rather than a power index to assign votes. 
O ur objective will be to determine how to minimize this error, so as to 
minimize the discrepancy between a voter’s shareholdings and his power.
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m . ESTABUSHING A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
POWER
Shapley, Banzhaf, and Owen Power Indices all indicated that shareholders 
A, B and C share equally the power in the firm (assuming either that all 
permutations or combinations of shareholders are equiprobable), though 
their shareholdings are far from equal. Shareholder D has no power, even 
though his holdings are signrficandy larger than those of shareholder E and 
65 percent as large of those of Shareholder C. In addition to being regarded 
cis unfair, inequitable distributions of corporate power may lead to inequita­
ble distributions of corporate cash flows and suboptimal investment and 
financing policy. A variety of measures may be employed to distribute power 
more equitably among shareholders. Included among these might be to:
1. Assign voting power among shareholders such that the power index 
of each is proportional to the num ber of shares that he holds.
2. Combine issues to be voted such that shareholders may spread their 
votes among issues based on their relative importance. This provides 
for what is typically termed a cumulative voting process.
3. Establish super-mjyority voting requirements for certain issues.
Cumulative voting processes are already well established in corporate 
charters in most states. However, this process is useful only if there is more 
than one issue of relatively equal importance to be determined in one 
election. The selection of a series of board members is an obvious example 
of such a situation. Many corporate issues such as proposed mergers and 
proposed amendments to corporate charters are not likely to be combined 
with other issues of comparable importance on a given election slate. Cumu­
lative voting differs from simple m ^ority voting only when more than one 
issue is to be determined by the corporate election.
Super-majority voting rules have the rather undesirable characteristics of 
being arbitrarily determined (e.g., why are 67 percent and 75 percent the 
most common super-majority thresholds?) and may confer upon minority 
shareholders unduly large levels of power. Furtherm ore, is it any more 
reasonable to require a 67 percent majority to pursue a given activity (e.g., to 
settle a given lawsuit out of court) than it is to require a 67 percent mzgorfty 
to not pursue that activity? This issue may be of particular importance to the 
small firm which is likely to make a larger num ber of decisions based on votes 
among its shareholders.
We suggest here that voter power will be more closely aligned with 
shareholdings in the elections of many small firms by employing a weighted 
voting scheme, using either Shapley, Banzhaf, or Owen Indices to weight or 
reassign shareholder votes. To use the Shapley value scheme, we first note 
that there are 120 = 5! voting permutations and pivots. We then rearrange 
the shareholders’ 99 votes such that their proportions of the 120 pivots are 
as close as possible to their proportional shareholdings; that is, we reassign 
votes so as to minimize g }  Such a vote weighting scheme is defined here to 
be optimal. Under most circumstances, we will not be able to eliminate all 
voting power discrepancies (or reduce o to zero) because each vote reassign­
m ent affects the ability of each coalition or combination to win. However, the 
accuracy of our reassignments would be expected to improve if we had a 
larger num ber of voters and potential pivots to rearrange. In our example, 
the minimum a  is determined with a simulation based on equation (1), with 
numerous possible combinations of votes held among investors. However, 
each solution held in common the same winning combinations (coalitions
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Table 5
Votes, Shapley Values (Si) and Squared Differences
i Wi fi Si s2
A 35 0.354 0.3666 0.000159
B 30 0.303 0.2833 0.000388
C 20 0.202 0.2020 0.000004
D 13 0.131 0.1166 0.000207
E 1 0.010 0.0333 0.000542
Total 99 1.00 0.9998 0.001301
= 5 r /5 = 0.0002595.
a = 0.016109.
Note: 5|-= Total of
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AB, AC, AD, BC and BDE) and the same num ber of pivots out of 120 for each 
shareholder (A: 44, B: 34, C: 24, D: 14, E: 4). One of the optimal vote weighting 
schemes is given in Table 5 such that shareholder A has 40.5 votes, B has 40 
votes, C has 9.1 votes, D has 8.9 votes and E has 0.5 votes. If fractional votes 
are not possible, vote assignments can be scaled. All of the other optimal 
weighting schemes resulted in similar reassignments. The G resulting from 
this assignment scheme is 0.0161, representing a significant improvement 
over the G of 0.0836 for the one-share one-vote rule.
Unlike the num ber of “Shapley pivots”, the num ber of “Banzhaf swings” 
is a function of the num ber of votes outstanding as well as the num ber of 
shareholders. W hereas the original vote assignment resulted in 32 swings, 
the optimal Banzhaf weighting scheme results in a total of 25 swings. 
Shareholder A will have nine, B will have seven, C will have five, D will have 
three and E will have one. The num ber of votes in one of these optimal 
schemes are given in Table 6. Again, other optimal Banzhaf weighting 
schemes result in similar vote reassignm ent levels. The G value is deter­
m ined to be 0.0178, a significant improvem ent over the one-share, one 
vote rule and approxim ately the same as the Shapley weighting scheme. If 
we assume that all shareholders are equally likely to jo in  all coalitions, the 
Owen Index would result in vote reassignments identical to those of the 
Banzhaf weighting schemes. However, the Owen Index weighting scheme 
would perm it the flexibility to reassign votes based on varying likelihoods 
of different coalition formations.
Table 6
Votes, Banzhaf Values (Bi) and Squared Differences
i Wi fi Bi 5 2
A 35 0.354 0.36 0.000036
B 30 0.303 0.28 0.000529
C 20 0.202 0.20 0.000004
D 13 0.131 0.12 0.000121
E 1 0.010 0.04 0.000900
Total 99 1.00 1.00 0.001590
= s t /5  = 0.000318.
a = 0.0178325.
Note: S t = Total of
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It is not clear which of the three weighting schemes here is best, though 
minimum a  values provide some information. No voting assignment scheme 
may be regarded as being perfect. The Banzhaf Index has the advantage in 
the corporate setting over the Shapley Indices in that it is based on equiprob- 
able voting coalitions or combinations (perhaps generating many “swingers” 
in a single winning coalition) rather than equiprobable voting permutations 
(orderings which will generate only one pivotal vote). This feature of the 
Banzhaf index may seem more intuitively reasonable since it is quite possible 
that more than one shareholder can influence results in a given election. 
However, Banzhaf values may behave rather oddly or bear little relationship 
to desirable characteristics of a power weighting scheme when the number 
of voters is large (see Dubey 8c Shapley, 1978). Nonetheless, it does seem clear 
from reductions in a  that reassignment of shareholder voting rights by either 
the Shapley, Banzhaf, or Owen weighting schemes of voting rights may 
provide for a better alignment of shareholdings and relative power.
NOTES
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1. A minority discoimt is a deduction from the proportional net asset value intended to 
reflect the shareholder’s less than proportional control in the firm. Such discounts are 
frequently permitted by tax authorities in determining share values in estate sales, for 
gift taxes, etc.
2. Of course, we could even vary the number of votes outstanding in the 99 share firm such 
that the we can establish a reassignment scheme such that the a  value can be set equal 
to zero.
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